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TPROBABILITY CALCULATIONS UNDER THE IAC HYPOTHESISMARK C. WILSON AND GEOFFREY PRITCHARDAbstract. We show how powerful algorithms recently developed for counting lattice points and com-puting volumes of convex polyhedra can be used to compute probabilities of a wide variety of eventsof interest in social choice theory. Several illustrative examples are given.
1. Introduction
Much research has been undertaken in recent decades with the aim of quantifying the probability of
occurrence of certain types of election outcomes for a given voting rule under fixed assumptions on the
distribution of voter preferences. Most prominent among these outcomes of interest are the so-called
voting paradoxes, which have been shown to be unavoidable, hence the interest in how commonly they
may occur. The survey [14] discusses these questions and gives a summary of results up to 2002.
In very many cases, particularly under the IAC hypothesis on voter preferences, the calculations
involved amount simply to counting integer lattice points inside convex polytopes. In the social
choice literature, two main methods have been used to carry out such computations. The first,
dating back several decades, decomposes the polytope into smaller pieces each of which can be treated
by elementary methods involving simplification of multiple sums. This method works fairly well for
simple problems but requires considerable ingenuity and perseverance to carry out even for moderately
complicated ones. More recently, more powerful methods have been introduced in [15, 12] but there
are several recent instances where even these methods did not suffice to solve natural questions about
3-candidate elections.
The purpose of the present paper is to point out that there is an established mathematical theory
of counting lattice points in convex polytopes (and the closely related issue of computing the volume
of such a region), which has been partially rediscovered by workers in social choice theory. The area
has recently been the subject of active research (see [4] for a good summary). Several more efficient
new algorithms have been devised and implemented in publicly available software.
We aim to apply these new methods to answer questions in voting theory that have proven beyond
the reach of previous authors. In addition we corroborate, correct, and unify the derivation of some
previously published results by using this methodology. We believe that the solution of many hitherto
difficult problems can now be relegated to a trivial computation. This should open the way for social
choice theorists to tackle more difficult and realistic problems. We note that Lepelley, Louichi and
Smaoui [21] have recently, and independently from us, circulated a preprint with a similar goal, which
covers very similar ground. The fact that two groups of researchers discovered this approach almost
simultaneously shows that the time has indeed come for these methods to be assimilated by the social
choice community.
The basic idea is that many sets of voting situations that are of interest can be characterized by
linear equations and inequalities. The variables are usually the numbers of voters with each of the
m! possible preference orders, where m is the number of alternatives. The set of such (in)equalities
defines a convex polytope in Rd for some d, given by Ax ≤ b for some matrix A (here d ≤ m! and the
inequality may be strict, because we may first use equality relations to eliminate variables and reduce
dimension). Each lattice point will correspond to a voting situation in the desired set. The probability
that a randomly chosen situation has the property under consideration is therefore a straightforward
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ratio of lattice point counts. Dividing through by n, the total number of voters, yields a convex
polytope P , independent of n, in Rd. For a given number n of voters, the dilation nP describes the
set of lattice points that we wish to enumerate.
2. Counting lattice points in convex polytopes
We give only a brief description here. For more information we recommend [4].
The Ehrhart series of the rational polytope P is a rational generating function F (t) = P (t)/Q(t) =∑
n ant
n whose nth Maclaurin coefficient an gives the number of lattice points inside the dilation nP .
The function f : n 7→ an is known to be a polynomial of degree d if all the vertices of P are integral;
otherwise it is a quasipolynomial of some minimal period e. That is, the restriction of f to each fixed
congruence class modulo e is a polynomial.
It is known that e is a divisor of m, wherem is an integer such that all coordinates of vertices of mP
are integers. The least such m is the least common multiple of the denominators of the coordinates
of the vertices of P when each coordinate is written in reduced terms. However there are examples
where e < m [23]. A method for determining e was presented in [15].
Many questions in voting theory are of most interest in the asymptotic case where n → ∞. For
small n, issues such as the method of tiebreaking used assume great importance, whereas in the limit
such issues disappear (the situations in which ties occur correspond in the limit to the boundary of
P ). We focus on limiting results in the present paper.
The leading coefficient of the quasipolynomial f is the same for all congruence classes: only the
lower degree terms differ. It is well known that this leading coefficient is precisely the volume of P .
For many purposes, knowledge of this coefficient is sufficient. The limiting probability under IAC as
n → ∞ is simply the volume of P divided by the volume of X where X is the analogously defined
polytope that describes all possible voting situations.
To compute the number of lattice points in nP , if that amount of detail is desired, we may use
one of several algorithms. An attractive approach pioneered by Barvinok makes heavy use of rational
generating functions; this is implemented in the software LattE [5, 16]. There are also several algo-
rithms available for volume computation; see [1] for a survey of algorithms, a hybrid of which has been
implemented in vinci [26] for floating point computation only. One of these algorithms has been used
in the Maple package Convex [3], and uses exact rational arithmetic.
The software LattE gives the Ehrhart series as standard output. In order to extract the quasipoly-
nomial formula for f(n) from the Ehrhart series, we may use interpolation. On each congruence class
modulo e, we must evaluate f(n) at d+1 distinct values of n in this class. Given the explicit expression
F (t) = P (t)/Q(t) and a computer algebra system, such evaluations are trivially obtained (the an sat-
isfy a linear recurrence relation with constant coefficients). The Lagrange interpolation formula then
yields the desired formula for the particular polynomial that is applicable for the given congruence
class.
Another (generally less efficient) method of extraction is to decompose F (t) into partial fractions.
Note that F (0) = 1 and we can arrange so that Q(t) factors as
∏
j(1−αjt) for some complex numbers
αj , possibly not distinct. We then have the partial fraction decomposition
F (t) =
∑
α
∑
k
cα,k(1− αt)
−k
where α runs over the roots of Q and k runs from 1 to the multiplicity of α.
This shows how the periodicity occurs: the factorization of Q(t) will introduce complex roots of
unity and the terms corresponding to powers of these will simplify on each congruence class. In fact,
on extracting the coefficient of tn we obtain
[tn]F (t) =
∑
α,k
αncα,k
(
n+ k − 1
k − 1
)
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and the terms αn simplify on each equivalence class modulo e. Note that e = 1 (that is, f(n) is a
single polynomial) if and only if Q factors completely over the rationals.
Note that since we know a priori that the coefficient of tn is polynomially growing, all α with |α| 6= 1
can be ignored, since their contribution must cancel (otherwise we would obtain terms exponentially
growing or decreasing in n). Unfortunately this observation does not help in the present case, because
the Ehrhart series has a denominator of the form
∏
i(1− t
ai), so all the αj above are in fact roots of
unity.
In summary, the Ehrhart series contains all information required to solve the problem of count-
ing lattice points in polytopes parametrized by a single parameter n. The hardest step is usually
determining the minimal period e.
3. Examples
In this section we compute, using the recipe above, a few probabilities under IAC that have been
considered in the recent social choice literature. We emphasize problems where older methods have
not yielded an answer, but also check results obtained by previous authors using older methods. Some
of these earlier results appear to be incorrect. The use of a computer algebra system such as Maple
[22] is essential for some of the more complicated examples.
3.1. Manipulability. We first consider the probability under IAC that a voting situation in a 3-
candidate election is manipulable by some coalition. Counterthreats are not considered — we assume
that some group of voters with incentive to manipulate will not be opposed by the other, naive, voters.
See [25, 6] for more discussion of these (standard) assumptions.
For the classical rules plurality and antiplurality, the answer is known: 7/24 and 14/27 respectively
[18, 19]. These results were derived by the earliest methods described above and required considerable
hand computation. However, for the Borda rule, no such result has been derived even using more
sophisticated methods. A good numerical approximation to the limit has been obtained. In [6] the
authors used the method of [15] to obtain bounds on the solution but could not carry out the full
computation. Using their method requires interpolation, hence computing the first 6e coefficients of
the Ehrhart series, where e is the minimal period of the quasipolynomial. They showed that e > 48,
and since they computed these coefficients by exhaustive enumeration, it was not possible to carry out
the computation to the end (the number of voting situations is of order n5). They estimated a value
of 0.5025 for the limit.
However with more powerful tools the answers are easily obtained. We let n1, . . . , n6 denote the
number of voters with sincere preference order abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba respectively, and let xi = ni/n.
Then
∑
i xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0. We use the linear systems derived for general positional rules in [25].
As shown in [25] we may assume without loss of generality that a wins, b is second, and c last in
the election (this assumption will only affect lower order terms in our resulting quasipolynomial, and
this is inevitable when different tie-breaking assumptions are made). Thus we must multiply our final
answer by 6 since we are only considering one of the 3! equally likely permutations of the candidates.
Plurality. We first consider the plurality rule. We define polytopes Pb, Pc, Pbc as follows. Consider the
inequalities
0 ≤ x1 + x2 − x3 − x4 (a beats b (sincere))(3.1)
0 ≤ x3 + x4 − x5 − x6 (b beats c (sincere))(3.2)
0 ≤ −x1 − x2 + x3 + x4 + x6 (b beats a (strategic))(3.3)
0 ≤ −x1 − x2 + 2x3 + 2x4 − x5 + 2x2 (b beats c (strategic)).(3.4)
The polytope Pb (the region where manipulation in favour of b is possible) is defined by the inequalities
(3.1) – (3.4), the equality
∑
i xi = 1, and the condition that all xi are nonnegative. Polytope Pc is
obtained by applying the permutation b↔ c, which induces the permutation x1 ↔ x2, x3 ↔ x5, x4 ↔
x6, and Pbc = Pb ∩ Pc is just given by the union of the two sets of inequalities defining Pb and Pc.
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The software LattE readily computes the Ehrhart series of each polytope. They are
Hb =
12 t12 + 24 t11 + 44 t10 + 56 t9 + 66 t8 + 64 t7 + 63 t6 + 44 t5 + 30 t4 + 14 t3 + 6 t2 + 2 t+ 1
(1− t)2 (1− t3)4 (1 + t)4 (1 + t2)3
Hc =
8 t12 + 16 t11 + 26 t10 + 34 t9 + 38 t8 + 40 t7 + 41 t6 + 30 t5 + 20 t4 + 10 t3 + 4 t2 + 2 t+ 1
(1− t4)3 (1− t)2 (1− t2) (1 + t+ t2)4
Hbc =
4 t8 + 5 t6 + 4 t5 + 4 t4 + 4 t3 + 2 t2 + 1
(1− t)4 (1− t4)2 (1 + t+ t2)4
The series we require is therefore
H := Hb +Hc −Hbc
=
16 t12 + 32 t11 + 57 t10 + 68 t9 + 78 t8 + 74 t7 + 73 t6 + 50 t5 + 33 t4 + 14 t3 + 6 t2 + 2 t+ 1
(1− t4)3 (1− t)2 (1− t2) (1 + t+ t2)4
.
Note that in order to factor the denominator of H completely we require both a cube root and fourth
root of 1, hence a field extension of degree 12. Thus we expect the period of the quasipolynomial
f(n) := [tn]H(t) to be 12. We may determine the polynomial formula for f on each congruence class
in more than one way, as described in section 2.
First, we try interpolation. Consider the polynomial expression valid for f(n) when n ≡ 0 mod 12.
This is a polynomial of degree 5 in n. We compute the values f(12j) for j = 0, . . . , 5 and then
determine the unique interpolating polynomial of degree 5 determined by these points, via, say, the
Lagrange inversion formula. The built-in commands in Maple find this polynomial immediately: the
answer is
f(n) =
7
17280
n5 +
1
108
n4 +
3
32
n3 +
15
32
n2 +
137
120
n+ 1 (n ≡ 0 mod 12).
As a check, we substitute n = 96 into this expression — the correct answer, namely [t96]H(t) =
4176821, is obtained. Analogous formulae can be obtained in the same way for the other congruence
classes modulo 12. For example, the result for n congruent to 6 modulo 12 is
f(n) =
7
17280
n5 +
1
108
n4 +
3
32
n3 +
15
32
n2 +
61
60
n+ 5/8 (n ≡ 6 mod 12),
while that for n congruent to 1 is given by
f(n) =
7
17280
n5 +
1
108
n4 +
341
5184
n3 +
5
36
n2 −
917
17280
n−
209
1296
(n ≡ 1 mod 12).
Note that since the number of voting situations is given by
(
n+5
5
)
= (n+ 1) · · · (n+ 5)/120, and we
have only counted one-sixth of the manipulable situations, the limiting probability of manipulability
is 720 times the leading coefficient of f , namely 7/24. This agrees with the results obtained in [18].
Note that the expressions for finite n do not agree, probably because of different tie-breaking assump-
tions yielding slightly different sets of manipulable voting situations. We use random tiebreaking as
described in [25], with a winner being chosen uniformly at random from the set of those with highest
score; the alternative used in many papers breaks the symmetry by breaking ties in favour of a fixed
but arbitrary order on the candidates. It is clear from the discussion at the beginning of the proof of
[18, Theorem 2] that the latter tiebreaking method is used in that paper.
As mentioned in section 2, another method would be to compute the full partial fraction decomposi-
tion of H over the extension field of Q generated by a primitive 12th root of 1. This can be done easily
by Maple. However the result is somewhat messy and the ensuing computation involving binomial
coefficients is certainly no easier than using interpolation, so we omit it.
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Borda. We now consider the Borda rule. We can attempt an analysis similar to the above (the
polytopes are defined in a similar manner, and all coefficients lie in {0,±1,±2,±3}), but we run into
serious complexity issues in this case.
The Ehrhart series Fb, Fc, Fbc given by LattE are such that when F := Fb + Fc − Fbc is simplified,
its denominator is a product of cyclotomic polynomials (minimal polynomials for roots of unity). The
corresponding roots of unity required are of orders whose least common multiple is 2520. So we are
still faced with the major task of computing e. It is still an open problem as to whether there exists an
algorithm to determine e which runs in polynomial time (in the input size) when the dimension is fixed.
A polynomial time algorithm to determine whether an integer p is equal to e was presented in [27], but
has not been implemented in software as far as we are aware. Of course, we do not need to know the
exact value of e, and we could assume it to be 2520. In order to determine exact formulae for f(n) in all
cases by interpolation, we would require the first 15120 values of f(n). Trying this in Maple we obtain
an overflow error. However it would be possible in principle to compute these using the recurrence
supplied by the rational form of F . We do not proceed further along these lines, but we indicate how
the computation would go. Writing P (t) =
∑
k bkt
k, Q(t) =
∑
k ckt
k, F (t) = P (t)/Q(t) =
∑
n ant
n and
comparing coefficients, we obtain bn =
∑
0≤k≤n ckf(n− k). This constant coefficient linear recurrence
allows us to determine sequentially f(0), . . . , f(r) where r = degP , and for n > r we have the defining
recurrence
∑
0≤k≤n ckf(n−k) = 0. In the present case degP = 75 and degQ = 82, so the computation
would be rather involved.
However, we can certainly determine the leading term of the quasipolynomial f , namely the volume
of a certain region. It is convenient to eliminate x6 throughout, using the sole equality constraint∑
i xi = 1. In other words we look at the projection onto the subspace x6 = 0. Since we are dividing
by the volume of the projection of the simplex the exact scale factor is unimportant. This projection
is defined by the conditions xi ≥ 0 and
∑5
i=1 xi ≤ 1 — we call these the standard inequalities.
The volume in R5 of this simplex is easily computed to be 1/5! = 1/120. Recalling the factor of 6
mentioned above, we shall therefore multiply the volume answer obtained below by 720 to compute
the limiting probability.
The volume required is given by inclusion-exclusion as vol(Rb)+vol(Rc)−vol(Rb∩Rc) where Rb, Rc
respectively denote the region for which manipulation in favour of b or c is possible.
The conditions describing the sincere outcome reduce, after elimination of x6, to
2x1 + 3x3 + 2x4 − x5 ≥ 1; (a beats b (sincere))(3.5)
2x1 + 3x2 − x4 + 2x5 ≥ 1; (b beats c (sincere))(3.6)
while the conditions describing the outcome after manipulation amount to
3x1 + 4x2 + 3x5 ≤ 2 (b beats a (strategic))(3.7)
x1 + 2x2 + 2x5 ≤ 1 (b beats c (strategic)).(3.8)
Now Rb is defined by the standard inequalities and those in (3.5) – (3.8). Also Rc is obtained by
applying the permutation b↔ c, which induces the permutation x1 ↔ x2, x3 ↔ x5, x4 ↔ x6, and Rbc
is given by the union of the two sets of inequalities defining Rb and Rc.
The package Convex [3] immediately yields the answer when given this input. The respective vol-
umes of Rb, Rc, Rbc are 371/559872, 881/6531840, 170873/1714608000 and the required limit is precisely
132953/264600 ≈ 0.5024678760.
The large denominators in the fractions above give a clue to the difficulty of this problem. Convex
also computes the vertices of the polytope. The least common multiple of the denominators of the
coordinates of the vertices is 72 for Rb, 504 for Rc, 1260 for Rbc. Thus the minimum period e is a
divisor of 23 · 32 · 5 · 7 = 2520, as we already knew from above.
3.2. Condorcet phenomena. See the two surveys and recent book by Gehrlein [10, 11, 13] for more
information about previous work on this topic.
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P |C A|C B|C (A ∩B)|C (A ∩ P )|C (B ∩ P )|C B|(P ∩ C) B|(A ∩ C)
0.88148 [9] 0.62963 [9] 0.91111[8] 0.61775 0.53040 0.81821 0.92282 0.98113
Table 1. (Joint) limiting Condorcet efficiencies of the standard positional rules under
IAC, 3 candidates
In [14] Gehrlein and Lepelley state “A very large number of studies (probably more than 50%
of the studies that have been devoted to probability calculations in social choice theory) have been
conducted to develop representations for the probability that Condorcet’s Paradox will occur, and for
the Condorcet efficiency of various rules, with the assumptions of IC and IAC.”
Condorcet’s paradox. Condorcet’s Paradox occurs in a voting situation when there is no Condorcet
winner — that is, no one candidate beats all others when only pairwise comparisons are considered.
This occurrence is independent of the voting rule being used. To compute its likelihood, we compute
the complementary event.
Suppose that we have 3 alternatives a, b, c. Let C be the event that a is the Condorcet winner. This
yields inequalities that boil down to
2x1 + 2x2 + 2x3 ≥ 1 (a beats b pairwise);(3.9)
2x1 + 2x2 + 2x5 ≥ 1 (a beats c pairwise).(3.10)
Let PC be the polytope defined by these and the standard inequalities. Then Convex yields vol(PC) =
1/384, so that Condorcet’s Paradox occurs with asymptotic probability 1− 3 · 5!/384 = 1/16 for IAC
with 3 alternatives. This is of course a known result dating back several decades.
Condorcet efficiency. Similarly we may compute the Condorcet efficiency of a given rule, namely
the conditional probability that it elects the Condorcet winner given that this winner exists. For a
given scoring rule defined by weights (1, λ, 0), let Xλ be the event that a is the winner when this rule
is used. Clearly Pr(Xλ) = 1/3.
These conditions describing Xλ amount to
x1 + (1 + λ)x2 + (2λ− 1)x3 + (λ− 1)x4 + 2λx5 ≥ λ (a beats b with rule λ)(3.11)
2x1 + (2− λ)x2 + (1 + λ)x3 + (1− λ)x4 + λx5 ≥ 1 (a beats c with rule λ).(3.12)
The Condorcet efficiency of rule λ is Pr(Xλ ∩C)/Pr(C) which equals 3 · 5!(16/15) vol(Pλ ∩PC). In
the special cases λ = 0, 1/2, 1 of plurality, Borda, antiplurality, respectively, we obtain 119/135, 41/45,
17/27. These last three results were obtained long ago by Gehrlein.
We can consider further intersections of such events. For example, Gehrlein has computed limiting
results under IC for the conditional probability that rule λ chooses the Condorcet winner given that
Borda does, that Borda does given that rule λ does, and that both rules choose the Condorcet winner
given that it exists. The answers to these questions are easily found for IAC using the above methods
and are listed in Table 1. These have not previously been published as far as we are aware (numbers
in brackets in that table represent citations). In Table 1 we let A|C denote the event that antiplurality
chooses the Condorcet winner given that it exists, B|(P ∩ C) the probability that Borda chooses the
Condorcet winner given that plurality does, etc. These can be computed easily using the events C
and Xλ above. For example, the entry B|(P ∩ C) corresponds to the probability of the event that
Borda and Condorcet agree given that plurality and Condorcet agree. This is simply the volume of
the polytope P1/2 ∩PC ∩P0 divided by the volume of P0 ∩PC (the factor of 3 cancels out because we
are computing conditional probabilities via P (E1|E2) = P (E1 ∩ E2)/P (E1)).
We consider even more intersections of such events in the next section.
In [2] the value of λ for which the positional rule with weights (1, λ, 0) is most Condorcet efficient
was determined. We call this “rule M” for brevity. The optimal value of λ is an algebraic irrational
number given as the root of a polynomial of degree 8 and to 5 decimal places equals 0.37228. The
corresponding value of the Condorcet efficiency is approximately 0.92546, only slightly more than that
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plurality rule M Borda antiplurality
0.0278 [17] 0.00131 0 0.0295 [17]
Table 2. Limiting probability of Borda’s paradox under IAC, 3 candidates
for Borda. To use this particular value of λ in computations similar to those above, it is probably best
to switch to software that performs floating point computations in order to compute volumes. One
such is vinci. We obtain for example that the joint Condorcet efficiency of the optimal rule and the
Borda rule equals, to 5 decimal places, 0.89183.
Borda’s Paradox. We finish here by discussing Borda’s Paradox. Some rules can elect a Condorcet
loser, namely a candidate that is beaten by every other when pairwise comparisons are made. The
probability of this event for plurality and antiplurality has been studied under IAC in [17], and it
has long been known to be zero for Borda. The methods in this section can be applied directly,
since we need only replace the Condorcet winner conditions by the same ones with the direction
of the inequality reversed. This shows that Borda’s Paradox occurs for plurality with probability
1/36, agreeing with [17]. The corresponding results for Borda and antiplurality are 0 and 17/576,
corroborating the previous results. The probability that the most Condorcet efficient rule above elects
the Condorcet loser is, as one might expect, very small. The results are shown in Table 2.
3.3. When do all common rules elect the same winner? For three-alternative elections, all
positional voting rules elect the same winner in a given situation if and only if both plurality and
antiplurality elect the same winner, since the vector of scores is a convex combination of those for the
two extreme rules. The probability of this event has been investigated under IC but not under IAC
as far as we are aware. In [24] Merlin, Tataru and Valognes also investigated the probability under
IC that all positional rules and all Condorcet efficient rules yield the same winner (in this case, all
scoring runoff rules also yield this same winner).
We again suppose that a is the winner. We want to compute the probability of the event P ∩
A as described in the previous section. The relevant polytope has 18 vertices and m = 12. Its
volume is 113/77760 and so the limiting probability that all positional rules yield the same winner
for 3 alternatives under IAC is 113/216 (this confirms a result in [12]). We could also investigate
the relationship between, say, plurality and Borda. They agree with probability 89/108, whereas
antiplurality and Borda agree with probability 1039/1512.
The probability that all Condorcet rules and all positional rules elect the same winner given that
the Condorcet winner exists is obtained easily via computation of Pr(P ∩C∩A) as above. The answer
is 3437/6480. The polytope involved has 29 vertices and m = 12.
We must also consider the case when no Condorcet winner exists. There are two cases corresponding
to the two cycles a, b, c, a and a, c, b, a. In the first case, [24] shows that the rules all agree if and only if
all positional rules give the ranking a, b, c, and this occurs if and only if both plurality and antiplurality
give that ordering. The computation is straightforward as above and the probability of this event is
only 5/10368. The contribution from the cyclic case is therefore 32 times this, or, 5/324, and the final
result for the probability that all rules agree is 10631/20736.
We can also consider the probability that two rules agree in their whole ranking, not just in the
choice of winner. This is easily computed similarly to above: plurality and antiplurality agree on their
whole ranking with probability 8/27, while Borda and plurality agree with probability 61/108. Borda
and antiplurality also agree with probability 61/108, which is clear by symmetry in any case.
3.4. Abstention and Participation Paradoxes. In [20] Lepelley and Merlin discuss various ways
in which voters can attempt to manipulate an election by abstaining from voting. All scoring runoff
rules and Condorcet rules suffer from this problem. Although abstaining turns out to be a dominated
strategy for scoring runoff rules, it is still of interest to compute the probability that a situation may be
manipulated in this way. Lepelley and Merlin carry this out under IC and IAC for scoring runoff rules
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Rules Elect same winner Agree whole ranking
Antiplurality and Borda 0.68717 0.56481
Antiplurality and plurality (hence all scoring rules) 0.52315 [12] 0.29630
Plurality and Borda 0.82407 0.56481
All common rules 0.51268
Table 3. Limiting probability of agreement of various rules under IAC, 3 candidates
Underlying rule PPP NPP PAP NAP
plurality [20] 0 0.07292 0 0.04080
Borda 0.01389 0.02083 0.01042 0.01389
antiplurality [20] 0.03822 0 0.04253 0
Table 4. Limiting probability of participation paradoxes for scoring runoff rules under
IAC, 3 candidates
based on plurality, antiplurality and Borda. For the latter (the Nanson rule) the limiting probability
was not computed exactly (Table 5 of [20] refers to results of Monte Carlo simulation). We compute
some exact values here.
We use the linear system given in [20]. Suppose that c is eliminated first and a then beats b in
the runoff. The Positive Participation Paradox occurs when voters ranking a first are added to the
electorate, and yet a then loses. This cannot happen when plurality is used at the first stage, but for
other rules it can happen that b now loses the first stage, and a subsequently loses the runoff against
c. Note that only voters with preference order acb can cause this to occur, and it can only occur when
c originally beats a pairwise.
The system describing this set of voting situations contains the inequalities stating that a beats b
and b beats c using the given scoring rule, and also that a beats b pairwise. In addition we have another
constraint as described in [20] (note that n6 in the first equation on p.58 of that paper should be −n6).
Carrying out the (by now routine) computation we obtain 1/72 which confirms the simulation result
0.14 referred to above. Note that the polytope involved has only 6 vertices and 6 facets but m = 18;
if e = 18 (which we have not checked), it would be difficult to compute the Ehrhart polynomial using
the old methods, which probably explains why only simulation results were obtained for the Nanson
rule in the paper cited above.
Similarly we may compute the result for each of several other participation paradoxes. The results
for the negative participation, positive abstention and negative abstention paradoxes (see [20] for
definitions and characterizations of the polytopes) are respectively 1/48, 1/96, 1/72 confirming the
earlier simulation results 0.020, 0.010, 0.14.
We can also perform the analogous computations for plurality and antiplurality runoff — the results
confirm those in [20] and are shown in Table 4.
3.5. The referendum paradox. This gives an example where the variables describing our polytopes
are slightly different.
In [7] the referendum or Compound Majority Paradox is studied. In the simplest case there are N
equal sized districts each having n voters. There are two candidates a and b and voters in each district
use majority rule to decide which candidate wins each district. The candidate winning a majority
of districts is the winner of the election; the paradox occurs when this candidate would have lost if
simple majority had been used in the union of all districts.
Among other things, the authors of [7] derive the probability of occurrence for N = 3, 4, 5 under
IAC using the older methods and state that they are not able to extend it to N ≥ 6. Using the
methods of the present paper it is easy to perform the computations for at least a few more values
of N . Let ni denote the number of voters voting for a in district i. The relevant set turns out to be
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number of districts 3 4 5 6 7 9
probability 0.125 [7] 0.02083 [7] 0.15885 [7] 0.04063 0.20419 0.26954
Table 5. Limiting probability of referendum paradox under IAC, 3 candidates
described (ignoring ties for simplicity) by the union of polytopes of the form
ni ≥ N/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (a wins k districts)
0 ≤ ni ≤ N/2 for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ N (b wins N − k districts)∑
i
ni ≤ Nn/2 (b wins overall)
for ⌊N/2⌋+1 ≤ k ≤ N−1. The polytope Pn corresponding to k must have volume multiplied by 2
(N
k
)
to account for the symmetries of the problem. Note that there are (n+1)N situations to consider and
so the leading term in n of the Ehrhart polynomial gives the probability required.
Doing the analogous computation for N = 3 and N = 4 we obtain (as n → ∞, in other words
computing the volume of Pn/n) results agreeing with [7]. However already for N = 5 we obtain
61/384 as opposed to their result 55/384. For N = 7 we have 9409/46080. The most complicated
corresponding polytope in the last case has 36 vertices and 11 facets, whereas for N = 9 it has 91
vertices and 14 facets. We did not attempt to find the maximum value of N for which our software
could obtain an answer; the answer was given essentially instantaneously for N = 9. The conjecture
in [7] that the probability tends to a limit of around 0.165 as N (odd) goes to infinity seems unlikely
in the light of these results.
4. Summary and discussion of future work
We have shown that a wide variety of natural probabilistic questions for 3-alternative elections under
IAC can be answered by applying standard algorithms for counting lattice points in, and computing
volumes of, convex polytopes. For 4 or more alternatives the computations are conceptually the
same but necessarily more complicated. However, the scope for extending results in the 3-candidate
case to 4 or more candidates is obviously higher than for the older methods, which now appear to be
completely superseded. One important point to notice is that many algorithms for volume computation
have running times that are very sensitive to the number of defining hyperplanes and the number of
vertices. Thus finding the most efficient description of the input system is important. It is certainly
clear that further progress in this area will require researchers in social choice theory to understand
in some detail how the fastest algorithms for lattice point counting and volume computation actually
work. This may even lead to proofs for larger (or general) numbers of candidates when the polytopes
concerned have a particularly nice structure.
Many questions naturally arise from our work here. One obvious line of attack is to try to find the
optimal parameter for 3-alternative scoring rules that minimizes the probability of a certain undesirable
behaviour occurring. The present authors are already engaged in carrying this out for the case of
(naive, coalitional) manipulability. Numerical results obtained in [25] show that the answer may well
be plurality, but this has never been proved. An attack on this problem along the lines of the approach
in the present paper would require computation of volumes of a polytope whose defining constraints
depend linearly in a parameter λ, and this requires considerable work as shown in [2]. Understanding
of how to carry out such a computation would help in understanding the variation between positional
rules. For example, the probability of electing a Condorcet loser is of order 0.03 for both plurality and
antiplurality, but an order of magnitude smaller near the Borda rule, and as a function of λ is very
flat there. Quantifying this type of variation analytically may show, for example, that it is not worth
the trouble of replacing Borda by the Condorcet-optimal positional rule.
Another direction is to consider other probability models. For simplicity here we have not considered
some common assumptions such as single-peaked preferences and the Maximal Culture Condition.
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Many computations in these cases reduce to ones identical in spirit to those we have undertaken here.
More general Po´lya-Eggenberger distributions would lead to the more difficult issue of integrals of
nonconstant probability densities over polytopes, but some results may be forthcoming there.
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